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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-DETERMINABLE FEE AS DEVISE
TO IMPOSE RACIAL R.EsTRICTIONS ON UsE OF LANn-Land was conveyed by
deed to the Park and Recreation Commission, a municipal corporation. The
grant was in the nature of a determinable fee, with the land to revert to
the grantor if it was ever used by members of any race other than the white
race. Members of the colored race petitioned the Park and Recreation
Commission for permission to use the recreational facilities erected on the
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land conveyed and the commission then sought a declaratory judgment
as to the legal effect of the possibility of reverter contained in the deed,
joining the petitioners and the grantors of the land as defendants. The
lower court held that there was a valid possibility of reverter and that upon
use of the land by non-whites the fee would terminate by its own limitation
and the estate would automatically revert to the grantor. Upon appeal to
the North Carolina Supreme Court, held, affirmed. The possibility of
reverter is valid and operates independently of judicial enforcement by the
state courts. Thus, its operation is not a violation of the equal protection
of the laws given to the petitioners by the Fourteenth Amendment.1 Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission v. Barringer, 242 N.C. 311, 88 S.E.
(2d) 114 (1955), cert. den. sub nom. Leeper v. Charlotte Park and Recreation Commission, (U: S. 1956) 76 S.Ct. 469.
The constitutional prohibition against the denial of equal protection of
the laws has exclusive reference to state action, which can be action by any
agency or instrumentality of the state, legislative, executive, or judicial.2
The clause covers discriminatory legislation favoring one group over another, discriminatory administration of an impartial law, 3 or exercise of
authority beyond the scope of the power given.4 In Shelley v. Kraemer the
Supreme Court, although invalidating the enforcement of a restrictive racial
covenant in the case before it, nevertheless said that "the restrictive agreements standing alone cannot be regarded as violative of any rights guaranteed. . . by the Fourteenth Amendment" and that they were constitutional so long as they were "effectuated by voluntary adherence to their terms." 5
This language invited attempts to enforce restrictive racial covenants without the use of state action and the principal case illustrates a possible means
of doing this. The court felt that since the possibility of reverter would
operate automatically the declaratory judgment procedure did not constitute state action. 6 While the court may be completely accurate in its
1 There were actually three deeds discussed in the principal case: the Barringer deed,
with which the court chiefly concerned itself, a deed from the Abbott Realty Company
which also contained a possibility of reverter (but on which the court did not dwell because the land conveyed by this deed was not the land the petitioners were seeking to use),
and a deed from the city of Charlotte containing a possibility of reverter. The court held
that this last deed, coming as it did from a municipality, violated the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Principal case at 323.
2 Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313 (1879).
3 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 6 S.Ct. 1064 (1886).
4 Ex parte Virginia, note 2 supra. See Barnett, "What is 'State' Action under the Fourteenth, Fifteenth, and Nineteenth Amendments of the Constitution?" 24 ORE. L. R.Ev. 227
(1945).
Ii Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I at 13, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948).
6 In contrast with the view taken by the court in the principal case, a California
court has held that since the restrictive covenant in question there was not enforceable,
there was no purpose served in giving a declaratory judgment as to the legal effect of the
covenant standing alone. Claremont Improvement Club, Inc. v. Buckingham, 89 Cal.
App. (2d) 32, 200 P. (2d) 47 (1948).
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analysis of the legal effect of the possibility of reverter,7 its failure to find
state action in the declaratory judgment procedure is not as unimpeachable
for "the judicial act of the highest court of the State, in authoritatively
construing and enforcing its laws, is the act of the State."S This is so
whether the law is the result of a legislative enactment or a judicial interpretation,9 and surely the law of property is within these confines.10 It is
hard to distinguish a state court decision that there is a valid possibility of
reverter contained in a deed and that upon use or purchase of the land
by a member of an excluded race the legal title will automatically revert
to the grantor from a decision divesting legal title from a member of an
excluded race who purchased the land.11 In both cases the state court is
determining that the use or purchase of the land by a member of an excluded race can affect the title to the land and this determination, requiring
as it does the construction of the property law of the state, should be considered state action. Yet even if a valid distinction could be made, the
result would not be at all desirable. If a member of an excluded race
purchased the land and obtained possession-an act terminating the feethe court could not enforce the possibility of reverter. Clearly, neither an
injunction against the party in possession12 nor damages against the party
who sold to a member of an excluded race13 could be obtained. Thus, the
court would be in the position of saying that there is a valid, but unenforceable, possibility of reverter14 or, in other words, telling the grantor
that he has good legal title to the land in question but that there is no way
that the court can help him get possession of the land. This would either
breed contempt for the law and the judicial process, or, worse, invite selfhelp in an area where feelings are already too inflamed. Drawing a distinction of this type would also place the city of Charlotte on the horns of a
7 See 1 SIMES AND SMITH, FUTURE INTERESTS, 2d ed., §281 (1956). However, the deed
primarily discussed in the principal case had one unique feature: before the land would
revert to the grantor because of use by non-whites, the grantor had to pay the grantee
$3,500. About all that can be said concerning such a possibility of reverter (if, indeed, it
is that at all) is that its operation is clearly far less automatic than the court believed.

Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 at 90-91, 29 S.Ct. 14 (1908).
Nashville, Chattanooga & St. Louis Ry. v. Browning, 310 U.S. 362 at 369, 60 S.Ct. 968
(1940).
10 "The power of the State. to create and enforce property interests must be exercised
within the. boundaries defined by the Fourteenth Amendment." Shelley v. Kraemer, note
5 supra, at 22. The law of contracts, torts, criminal law, etc., would also fall within these
confines. It has been argued that the result of this position would destroy the delicate
balance between the state and federal judicial systems and be tantamount to placing
the federal courts over the state courts as a final court of appeals in all cases in which
there was any allegation of a denial of due process or equal protection. For a warning
against thus extending federal review over state courts, see JACKSON, THE SUPREME COURT
IN THE AMERICAN SYSTEM OF GOVERNME..'IT 69-72 (1955).
11 This was the result reached by tp.e Missouri Supreme Court in Kraemer v. Shelley,
355 Mo. 814, 198 S.W. (2d) 679 (1947).
12 See Shelley v. Kraemer, note 5 supra.
13 See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 73 S.Ct. 1031 (1953).
14 The concept of a valid but unenforceable right is present in the law of trusts. See
Bryant v. Klatt, (D.C. N.Y. 1924) 2 F. (2d) 167, a case involving an oral trust in relation
to a conveyance c:>f land.
8
9
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dilemma. If the city allows members of the excluded races to use the recreational facilities erected on the property, it loses the land. On the other
hand, the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits
the maintenance of recreational facilities solely for the use of the white
race.15 Perhaps this case points out the need for a reevaluation by the Supreme Court of the problem of restrictive racial convenants. For as long as
these covenants are held valid if adhered to by the parties and invalid only
if enforced by state action, there will be an infinite variety of attempts to
achieve, by subterfuge, the goal of restricting the use of property to certain
races.16
Charles B. Renfrew, S. Ed.

15 See Dawson v. Mayor and City Council of Baltimore, (4th Cir. 1955) 220 F. (2d)
386, affd. 350 U.S. 877, 76 S.Ct. 133 (1955), where the maintenance of separate but equal
municipal recreational facilities was held to be a violation of the equal protection clause.
16 32 Bosr. UNIV. L. REv. 320 (1952), lists some of the methods by which racial covenants might be enforced without the use of state action.

